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ARTICLES

APPLYING THE FIRST AMENDMENT TO THE INTERNAL
REVENUE CODE: MINNESOTA VOTERS ALLIANCE AND THE
TAX LAW’S REGULATION OF NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS’
POLITICAL SPEECH
Edward A. Zelinsky*
INTRODUCTION
In Minnesota Voters Alliance v. Mansky,1 the U.S. Supreme Court
struck on First Amendment grounds Minnesota’s “political apparel
ban.”2 This law prohibits individuals from wearing “political badges,
political buttons, or other political insignia . . . at or about [any]
polling place.”3 The Minnesota statute, the Court held, unreasonably
restricts constitutionally protected expression at the polls.4 The
statute’s “expansive”5 term political is “unmoored,”6 proscribing in
“indeterminate”7 fashion not just buttons and clothing mentioning
the candidates, parties, and ballot questions being voted upon, but
also forbidding apparel referring to issues and groups extrinsic to the
election.8 As it lacks “objective, workable standards,”9 the Court held,

* Edward A. Zelinsky is the Morris and Annie Trachman Professor of Law at the Benjamin
N. Cardozo School of Law of Yeshiva University. For comments on prior drafts of this Article,
Professor Zelinsky thanks Professors Brannon P. Denning, Mitchell L. Engler, Daniel Hemel,
and David Rudenstine. For research assistance, Professor Zelinsky thanks Xiaoquan Wu and
Vincent Licata, both of the Cardozo Class of 2019.
1 Minn. Voters All. v. Mansky, 138 S. Ct. 1876 (2018).
2 Minn. Voters All., 138 S. Ct. at 1882, 1883, 1885.
3 MINN. STAT. § 211B.11(1) (2019), invalidated by Minn. Voters All. v. Mansky, 138 S. Ct.
1876 (2018).
4 See Minn. Voters All., 138 S. Ct at 1891–92.
5 Id. at 1888.
6 Id.
7 Id. at 1889.
8 See id.
9 Id. at 1891.
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the Minnesota law banning “political” apparel in polling places
violates the First Amendment in light of “the potential for erratic
application.”10
Minnesota Voters Alliance thus confirmed the ability of voters to
wear political clothes and buttons to the polls as long as such clothes
and buttons do not mention candidates, political parties, or ballot
questions at issue in the current election.11
On its face, Minnesota Voters Alliance is about which t-shirts, hats,
and buttons voters can wear at the polls. However, the Court’s First
Amendment analysis in Minnesota Voters Alliance extends beyond
apparel at polling places. That decision impacts the ongoing debate
about the Johnson Amendment,12 the now controversial provision of
the Internal Revenue Code (“Code”) that forbids organizations listed
in section 501(c)(3)13 from intervening in political campaigns.
Minnesota Voters Alliance also affects the proper construction of
section 501(c)(3)’s ban on lobbying by tax-exempt entities14 as well as
other provisions of the tax law taxing and precluding campaign
intervention by tax-exempt organizations.15
Minnesota Voters Alliance requires that these provisions of the tax
law16 be construed to comply with the First Amendment mandate
that restrictions on speech be reasonable, objective, workable and
determinate.
After Minnesota Voters Alliance, the Johnson
Amendment should be interpreted as only proscribing 501(c)(3)
entities from expressly endorsing or opposing particular candidates,

Id. at 1890.
See id. at 1891.
12 For background on the Johnson Amendment, see EDWARD A. ZELINSKY, TAXING THE
CHURCH: RELIGION, EXEMPTIONS, ENTANGLEMENT, AND THE CONSTITUTION 188–91 (2017)
[hereinafter ZELINSKY, TAXING THE CHURCH], and Edward A. Zelinsky, Churches’ Lobbying and
Campaigning: A Proposed Statutory Safe Harbor for Internal Church Communications, 69
RUTGERS U. L. REV. 1527, 1528, 1531 (2017) [hereinafter Zelinsky, Safe Harbor]. See also Ellen
P. Aprill, Amending the Johnson Amendment in the Age of Cheap Speech, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV.
ONLINE 1, 1.
13 See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012); ZELINSKY, TAXING THE CHURCH, supra note 12, at 188.
14 For background on § 501(c)(3)’s ban on lobbying, see ZELINSKY, TAXING THE CHURCH,
supra note 12, at 191, and Zelinsky, Safe Harbor, supra note 12, at 1529, 1532.
15 See I.R.C. § 527(f)(1) (2012); Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)–1 (as amended in 1990).
16 The First Amendment standard of determinacy articulated in Minnesota Voters Alliance
also impacts the proper understanding of § 162(e) of the Code, which denies for-profit trades
and businesses an income tax deduction for outlays “incurred in connection with” lobbying and
political campaigning. I.R.C. § 162(e)(1) (2012); Minn. Voters All. v. Mansky, 138 S. Ct. 1876,
1891 (2018). This Article focuses upon the implications of Minnesota Voters Alliance for
nonprofit entities, both to keep the length of the Article manageable and also because the
greatest contemporary controversy is about the political activities of nonprofit organizations,
churches in particular.
10
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political parties, or ballot questions or from engaging in the
“functional equivalent” of such express advocacy.17 Under this test,
tax-exempt entities would not be precluded from engaging in more
general issue advocacy.
The other provisions of the tax law preventing tax-exempt entities
from participating in political campaigns and taxing such
participation should be construed in the same way. These other
features of the tax law should be understood as precluding and taxing
only express advocacy of, or opposition to, particular candidates,
parties, or ballot questions, or as prohibiting and taxing the
functional equivalent of such explicit expression.
In light of Minnesota Voters Alliance, the 501(c)(3) lobbying ban
should be interpreted similarly, as only prohibiting tax-exempt
entities from explicitly supporting or opposing pending legislative
proposals or from undertaking the functional equivalent of such
explicit advocacy about pending legislation. The 501(c)(3) lobbying
ban should not prevent tax-exempt entities from discussing public
policy questions more generally, even though such questions can be
formulated as legislative proposals. Section 4911 of the Code already
propounds for certain electing exempt organizations such a First
Amendment-compliant standard.18
As currently understood by the IRS and the Treasury, the Code’s
restrictions on the political expression of tax-exempt entities sweep
too broadly and too vaguely to satisfy these constitutional standards.
According to the IRS’s current administrative interpretation of the
Johnson Amendment, that provision of the Code proscribes “issue
advocacy that functions as political campaign intervention.”19 This
expansive test is, like the Minnesota apparel statute struck in
Minnesota Voters Alliance, unmoored and indeterminate and is, thus,
unreasonable for First Amendment purposes. To establish objective,
workable standards in light of Minnesota Voters Alliance, the IRS’s
construction of the Johnson Amendment should prohibit only explicit

17 Cf. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 469–70 (2007) (“[A] court should find that
an ad is the ‘functional equivalent’ of express advocacy only if the ad is susceptible of no
reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate.”).
18 See I.R.C. § 4911 (2012). As I discuss infra, some tax-exempt organizations may elect the
safe harbor provided by I.R.C. § 501(h) for lobbying expenditures. Section 501(h), in
conjunction with § 4911, provides rules about lobbying more consonant with Minnesota Voters
Alliance. See I.R.C. §§ 501(h), 4911(a)–(b); Minn. Voters All., 138 S. Ct. at 1891. This Article
argues that, as a matter of First Amendment law, these more determinant rules should, by
administrative action or by modification of the Code, be extended to all tax-exempt entities, not
just those which can and do make the § 501(h) safe harbor election.
19 Rev. Rul. 2007-41, 2007-1 C.B. 1421, 1424.
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endorsements of, or opposition to, candidates, parties, and ballot
issues involved in the current election and the functional equivalent
of such express endorsement or opposition. Under this more carefully
tailored construction of the Johnson Amendment, nonprofit
organizations, churches in particular, would no longer risk the loss of
tax-exempt status by engaging in issue advocacy that falls short of
overt support for, or opposition to, specific candidates, political
parties, or ballot questions.
Similarly, Minnesota Voters Alliance requires the reformation of
the Treasury regulation that interprets the statutory ban preventing
501(c)(3) organizations from “[a]dvocat[ing] the adoption or rejection
of legislation.”20 Virtually any issue of public concern can result in
legislation.21 Under Minnesota Voters Alliance, this expansive test
should also, as a constitutional matter, be limited to the championing
of, or opposition to, particular proposals currently pending before
legislative bodies or slated for a popular vote. Under this more
precise construction of the Code’s general prohibition on lobbying by
nonprofit organizations,22 such organizations, including churches,
would not risk the forfeiture of tax-exempt status through their
statements on public policy as long as such statements do not endorse
or object to particular legislation that has been introduced in a
lawmaking body or that is subject to an impending vote by the
electorate.
Part I of this Article explores the Court’s decision in Minnesota
Voters Alliance, which establishes that, under the banner of
reasonability, the First Amendment requires “objective, workable
standards” when political expression is regulated by the
government.23
Restrictions on voter apparel that mentions
candidates, parties, and ballot questions satisfy this standard of
reasonability; broader restrictions on “political” clothing do not.24
Parts II, III, and IV explore, in light of Minnesota Voters Alliance,
the provisions of the Code that regulate the political expression of
tax-exempt institutions. Part II examines Revenue Ruling 2007-41
in which the IRS contends that, depending upon the “facts and
circumstances” of particular instances, “issue advocacy” can
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3)(ii)(b) (as amended in 2017).
See JOHN V. SULLIVAN, HOW OUR LAWS ARE MADE, H.R. Doc. No. 110-49, at 4 (2007).
22 As noted in Section IV.B, infra, the more narrowly-tailored prohibition on tax-exempt
lobbying implemented by §§ 501(h) and 4911 is more First Amendment compliant.
23 Minn. Voters All., 138 S. Ct. at 1891.
24 Id. at 1888 (citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Ed. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788,
808–09 (1985)).
20
21
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constitute forbidden campaign intervention for purposes of section
501(c)(3).25 The Court’s analysis in Minnesota Voters Alliance implies
that Revenue Ruling 2007-41, like the Minnesota apparel statute,
sweeps too broadly and too imprecisely.26 Indeed, Revenue Ruling
2007-41 unconstitutionally condemns as forbidden campaigning an
ill-defined set of statements that address issues of public policy even
if no candidate, party, or ballot question is explicitly endorsed or
opposed.
Part III discusses the tax imposed by section 527(f)27 on civic
organizations, labor unions, business associations, and other taxexempt institutions when they attempt to “influence” elections.28
This Part also discusses the Treasury regulation that holds that
organizations tax-exempt under section 501(c)(4)29 cannot intervene
in political campaigns.30 Minnesota Voters Alliance indicates that
these provisions, as currently understood, are overly broad, often
nebulous restrictions on political expression, too indeterminate to
pass First Amendment scrutiny.31
Part IV confronts the Code’s ban on lobbying by 501(c)(3)
organizations. Minnesota Voters Alliance indicates that this ban
must also be construed more carefully to prohibit only express
support for, or opposition to, particular bills pending before
legislative bodies or scheduled for a popular vote. An organization’s
tax-exempt status should not be forfeited by statements about public
policies that could be implemented by legislation since virtually any
position on any public policy can be implemented by state, local or
federal legislation. Section IV.B highlights the Code’s disparate
treatment of tax-exempt organizations which can and do elect the
lobbying safe harbor provided by sections 501(h) and 4911 and the
treatment of tax-exempt entities which cannot or do not make that
election. The former, by virtue of the safe harbor election, are subject
to restrictions that are more consonant with the First Amendment
standards of Minnesota Voters Alliance than are the latter.
Having established that these provisions of the tax law are today
understood too capaciously to pass First Amendment scrutiny, Part V
Rev. Rul. 2007-41, 2007-1 C.B. 1421, 1421, 1424.
See Minn. Voters All., 138 S. Ct. at 1891 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S.
781, 794 (1989)).
27 I.R.C. § 527(f) (2012).
28 See § 527(f)(1).
29 I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) (2012).
30 See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(ii) (as amended in 1990).
31 See Minn. Voters All., 138 S. Ct. at 1888 (citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ.
Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 808–09 (1985)).
25
26
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of this Article addresses the administrative understanding of these
provisions which would satisfy the test of Minnesota Voters Alliance
that restrictions on political expression be reasonable, objective, and
determinant. The particular implementation of that principle in
Minnesota Voters Alliance does not work well in these other settings,
that is, the Johnson Amendment, the section 527(f) tax on political
participation, the Treasury regulation forbidding campaign
intervention by civic leagues, and section 501(c)(3)’s general lobbying
ban. Under Minnesota Voters Alliance, states can forbid individuals
from wearing to the polls buttons or clothes that mention candidates,
parties, or ballot issues involved in the current election.32 This “no
mention” test works well for voting place apparel because voting is a
discrete activity which occurs briefly at a particular point in time.33
In this setting, forbidding the names of candidates, parties, or ballot
issues is a targeted rule easily administrable at a specific point in
time, to wit, an election day presence at the polls.
But this “no mention” test does not work well in other settings that
extend over long periods. The stricture against naming candidates,
parties, and ballot questions is overly broad in other contexts and can
interfere with much generalized political discussion. Our political
culture today is a “permanent campaign.”34 Except for public officials
who are term-limited or who have formally renounced re-election, all
public officials are continually running for re-election around the
calendar. If the no-mention-of-a-candidate rule applied to the
Johnson Amendment, 501(c)(3) organizations could never utter the
name of any elected official since all officials are today continuously
running for re-election. Thus, a rule against using the name of any
candidate, despite its appeal in the context of apparel at the polls,
would be overly broad in the context of the Johnson Amendment and
would forbid much speech which is not campaign intervention.
In lieu of the “no mention” test, I propose that, for purposes of
applying Minnesota Voters Alliance to the Johnson Amendment, the
applicable test should be the standard articulated by Chief Justice
Roberts in FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc.35 Under this test, the
Johnson Amendment would be understood as precluding the express

See Minn. Voters All., 138 S. Ct. at 1891.
See Charles Stewart III, Waiting to Vote in 2012, 28 J.L. & POL. 439, 450 (2013) (finding
that in 2008 and 2012 two-thirds of voters waited ten minutes or less to vote).
34 See, e.g., Hugh Heclo, Campaigning and Governing: A Conspectus, in THE PERMANENT
CAMPAIGN AND ITS FUTURE 1, 26 (Norman J. Ornstein & Thomas E. Mann eds., 2000).
35 See FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 469 (2007).
32
33
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advocacy of specific candidates, parties, or ballot questions and “the
functional equivalent of express advocacy.”36 Tax-exempt entities
and their personnel could mention public officials but could not
articulate explicit support for, or opposition to, such officials’ reelection.37 For these purposes, the functional equivalence of express
advocacy would be defined restrictively as the Chief Justice did in
Wisconsin Right to Life, namely, a statement “susceptible of no
reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or
against a specific candidate.”38
Likewise, the tax imposed by section 527(f) on the political activity
of tax-exempt institutions and the 501(c)(4) regulations that prevent
civic leagues from engaging in campaigning should only tax and
preclude explicit endorsements of and opposition to particular
candidates, parties, and ballot questions and the functional
equivalent of such explicit support or opposition. Again, functional
equivalence should be construed narrowly as the Chief Justice did in
Wisconsin Right to Life, that is, as “susceptible of no reasonable
interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific
candidate,”39 party, or ballot question.
Similarly, section 501(c)(3)’s general lobbying ban should be
understood to permit discussion of any public policy issue that could
result in legislation.
To comply with the First Amendment
reasonability test of Minnesota Voters Alliance,40 the 501(c)(3)
lobbying ban should only prevent express advocacy for or against
specific pending legislation or “the functional equivalent of such
express advocacy.”41
This change could be accomplished
administratively or legislatively, extending in either fashion the
more precise standards of sections 501(h) and 4911 to all 501(c)(3)
entities.42
This Article then places Minnesota Voters Alliance in the context of
Regan v. Taxation with Representation,43 which upheld against

Id.
Cf. id.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 See Minn. Voters All. v. Mansky, 138 S. Ct. 1876, 1888 (2018) (“[T]he State must draw a
reasonable line. . . . [T]he State must be able to articulate some sensible basis for distinguishing
what may come in from what must stay out.” (citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ.
Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 808–09 (1985)).
41 Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. at 482.
42 See I.R.C. § 501(h) (2012 & Supp. V 2018); I.R.C. § 4911 (2012).
43 Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
36
37
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constitutional challenge section 501(c)(3)’s ban on lobbying.44 The
Taxation with Representation Court did not confront the content of
this ban; it merely held that such a ban is constitutional.45 Minnesota
Voters Alliance similarly implies that the 501(c)(3) lobbying ban,
properly construed, is constitutional. But Minnesota Voters Alliance
indicates that such constitutionality depends upon the lobbying ban
being formulated reasonably, workably, and objectively.46
Consequently, an institution should lose its tax-exempt status
under the Johnson Amendment for campaigning only if such
institution explicitly endorses or opposes a candidate, political party,
or ballot issue or engages in expression that cannot reasonably be
understood as other than such an endorsement or opposition.
Similarly, an entity should forfeit its tax-exempt status for lobbying
only if the entity supports or calls for defeat of a particular legislative
proposal currently pending before a public lawmaking body or before
the electorate. In this way, Taxation with Representation is
compatible with Minnesota Voters Alliance: tax-exempt organizations
can be proscribed from lobbying and campaigning as long as such
prohibited lobbying and campaigning is defined reasonably for First
Amendment purposes.47
Part VII addresses three potential rejoinders to my argument
including an alternative, more restricted reading of Minnesota Voters
Alliance as a case just about clothing. This Part also addresses the
limited support that the Chief Justice’s position enjoyed from the
Court in Wisconsin Right to Life. Finally, Part VII addresses the
argument that the Code-based prohibitions on tax-exempt
organizations’ campaigning and lobbying are in practice not
aggressively enforced by the IRS.
The Code need not be amended to fashion these statutory
provisions to comply with Minnesota Voters Alliance, though
modifying the language of the Code is one way that the Code’s
restrictions on the political speech of tax-exempt entities could be
brought into compliance with the First Amendment. Alternatively,
such compliance could be achieved administratively by revoking the
portions of Revenue Ruling 2007-41 pertaining to issue advocacy

See id. at 546, 550.
See id. at 549–50. But see id. at 553–54 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (noting that 501(c)(3)
organizations may lobby through a 501(c)(4) affiliate, but then cautioning that restricting
501(c)(4) affiliates’ speech may render § 501(c)(3)’s ban constitutionally infirm).
46 See Minn. Voters All., 138 S. Ct. at 1891.
47 See id. at 1888 (citing Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 808–09); Taxation with Representation, 461
U.S. at 550.
44
45
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under the Johnson Amendment and by amending the regulations
under section 501(c)(3) to clarify that forbidden lobbying occurs only
when a tax-exempt entity explicitly supports or calls for defeat of a
particular legislative proposal pending before a public lawmaking
body or before the electorate. Similarly, the IRS can modify Revenue
Ruling 2004-6 to bring it into compliance with the First Amendment
standard of determinacy announced in Minnesota Voters Alliance.
Likewise, the Treasury can by regulation clarify that, for purposes of
sections 527 and 501(c)(4),48 campaign intervention means explicit
endorsement of, or opposition to, a candidate, not more generalized
discussion of issues and legislation. The Treasury would thereby
interpret those Code-based restrictions on political activity in a
manner that, contrary to current law, satisfies the First Amendment
signposts of reasonability and determinacy articulated in Minnesota
Voters Alliance.
I. MINNESOTA VOTERS ALLIANCE V. MANSKY
The American polling station was once a rowdy place.49 Like other
states of the union, Minnesota adopted a law designed to create an
orderly environment in which voters cast their ballots.50 The
Minnesota statute creates a zone within which campaigning,
including the “display [of] campaign material,” may not occur.51 This
campaign-free zone includes the polling place itself and extends to
the area “within 100 feet of the building in which a polling place is
situated.”52
Minnesota’s statute also proscribes any person from “provid[ing]
political badges, political buttons, or other political insignia to be
worn at or about the polling place on the day of a primary or
election.”53 These two provisions of the Minnesota law were not
challenged in Minnesota Voters Alliance.54

48 As noted infra, Congress has in the past blocked the Treasury from promulgating
regulations under § 501(c)(4). See infra note 236 and accompanying text. It remains to be seen
whether the current, 116th Congress will do so as well.
49 See Minn. Voters All., 138 S. Ct. at 1882–83; see also Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 224–27
(2010) (Scalia, J., concurring) (describing traditional voting practices including viva voce
voting).
50 See MINN. STAT. § 211B.11(1) (2019), invalidated by Minn. Voters All. v. Mansky, 138 S.
Ct. 1876 (2018); Minn. Voters All., 138 S. Ct. at 1882–83.
51 § 211B.11(1).
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 See Minn. Voters All., 138 S. Ct. at 1883.

0001 ZELINSKY, APPLYING THE FIRST AMENDMENT TO THE IRC

10

Albany Law Review

1/17/2020 2:37 PM

[Vol. 83.1

The remaining portion of the Minnesota statute establishing
polling place decorum was challenged and ultimately struck as
unconstitutional:55 “A political badge, political button, or other
political insignia may not be worn at or about the polling place on
primary or election day.”56
Those challenging this law did not seek to wear into the polls
buttons or other insignia supporting or opposing candidates, political
parties, or ballot questions involved in the current election.57 Rather,
they wanted to display buttons and clothing reflecting more
generalized political themes and affiliations.
One individual
“planned to wear a ‘Tea Party Patriots’ shirt” into the polls.58 Other
voters, protesting Minnesota’s lack of a voter identification law,
sought to display buttons “with the words ‘Please I. D. Me,’ a picture
of an eye, and a telephone number and web address for” an
organization supporting voter identification laws.59 One of the
plaintiffs wore the “[‘Please I. D. Me’] button and a T-shirt with the
words ‘Don’t Tread on Me’ and the Tea Party Patriots logo.”60 “One
individual was asked to cover up his Tea Party shirt” in order to
vote.61 Another was allowed to vote only “after an election judge
recorded” his name and address for potential referral for sanctions
under the Minnesota statute forbidding “political” apparel at polling
places in the North Star State.62
When the case reached the U.S. Supreme Court, the Court
classified a polling place as a “nonpublic forum.”63 In such a forum,
governments may enact speech regulation that is “reasonable in light
of the purpose served by the forum”64 as long as such regulation is
“not an effort to suppress expression merely because public officials
oppose the speaker’s view.”65
Minnesota’s law flunked this First Amendment test of
reasonability. While states can regulate polling place apparel “so

See id. at 1885.
§ 211B.11(1).
57 See Minn. Voters All., 138 S. Ct. at 1884.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 1886.
64 Id. at 1885 (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806
(1985)).
65 Minn. Voters All., 138 S. Ct. at 1885 (quoting Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’
Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983)).
55
56

0001 ZELINSKY, APPLYING THE FIRST AMENDMENT TO THE IRC

2019/2020]

Applying the First Amendment to the IRC

1/17/2020 2:37 PM

11

that voters may focus on the important decisions immediately at
hand[,] . . . the State must draw a reasonable line”66 between
permitted and proscribed apparel: “[T]he unmoored use of the term
‘political’ in the Minnesota law, combined with haphazard
interpretations the State has provided in official guidance and
representations to this Court, cause Minnesota’s restriction to fail
even this forgiving test.”67 According to the Court, the Minnesota
statute “does not define the term ‘political.’ And the word can be
expansive.”68
As an example, the Court observed that “a button or T-shirt merely
imploring others to ‘Vote!’” could run afoul of the Minnesota
prohibition on political apparel in the polling place.69 The use of the
term “campaign material” in the first part of the Minnesota statute
makes clear that “political” apparel is a “broader” category that goes
beyond campaign-related clothing and buttons.70
The Court indicated that a more carefully tailored statute
regulating polling place apparel passes the constitutionally
mandated test of reasonability.71 Central to this discussion of the
Minnesota statute was a state-issued “Election Day Policy,” which
reflected the state’s understanding of the statute.72 The Court
approved as “clear enough” for First Amendment purposes three
examples of forbidden apparel cited in that policy: “[I]tems displaying
the name of a political party, items displaying the name of a
candidate, and items demonstrating ‘support of or opposition to a
ballot question.’”73
However, the Court ruled, the Minnesota statute goes beyond these
reasonable restrictions to ban at polling places apparel of an
“indeterminate” nature.74 As construed by Minnesota in its Policy
statement, the apparel statute prevents a voter from wearing at the
polls any clothing or buttons that address “any subject on which a
political candidate or party has taken a stance.”75 The Court
expressed its disapproval:

66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75

Minn. Voters All., 138 S. Ct. at 1888.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1889.
See id. at 1891.
See id. at 1884.
Id. at 1889.
Id. at 1891.
Id. at 1881.
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A rule whose fair enforcement requires an election judge to
maintain a mental index of the platforms and positions of
every candidate and party on the ballot is not reasonable.
Candidates for statewide and federal office and major political
parties can be expected to take positions on a wide array of
subjects of local and national import. Would a “Support Our
Troops” shirt be banned, if one of the candidates or parties had
expressed a view on military funding or aid for veterans?
What about a “#MeToo” shirt, referencing the movement to
increase awareness of sexual harassment and assault? At oral
argument, the State indicated that the ban would cover such
an item if a candidate had “brought up” the topic.76
Minnesota’s policy guide interpreting the political apparel statute
also construed the statute’s ban on political clothing as prohibiting
“any item ‘promoting a group with recognizable political views.’”77
This, the Court sardonically observed, “makes matters worse.”78 This
understanding of “political” apparel could proscribe at the polls
clothing and buttons for “the American Civil Liberties Union, the
AARP, the World Wildlife Fund, and Ben & Jerry’s, [which] all have
stated positions on matters of public concern.”79 Indeed, under this
interpretation of the Minnesota statute, the statute might forbid a
Boy Scout troop leader from wearing his uniform when he votes, as
the Boy Scouts have views on matters of public concern.80 The
Minnesota political apparel ban is, thus, “an indeterminate
prohibition”81 that invites “erratic application”82 because it lacks
“objective, workable standards.”83
The Court made clear that a more precise statute regulating
polling place apparel could pass the First Amendment test of
reasonability if it “proscrib[es] displays (including apparel) in more
lucid terms.”84 Thus, for example, a state may protect polling place
decorum by outlawing a button or shirt “relating to a candidate,

76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84

Id. at 1889–90 (internal citations deleted).
Id. at 1890.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 1891.
Id. at 1890.
Id. at 1891.
Id.
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measure, or political party appearing on the ballot.”85 By such
targeted prohibitions, a state can create a polling place “removed
from the clamor and din of electioneering.”86 But Minnesota’s statute
is not “a law capable of reasoned application”87 and, thus, like the
public school prohibition on anti-war arm bands invalidated in
Tinker,88 runs afoul of the First Amendment because of “the potential
for erratic application.”89 “[A]n indeterminate prohibition carries
with it ‘[t]he opportunity for abuse.’”90
II. REVENUE RULING 2007-41 AND ISSUE ADVOCACY
In Revenue Ruling 2007-41, the IRS describes its understanding of
the reach of the Johnson Amendment, the provision of the Code that
prevents organizations tax-exempt under section 501(c)(3) from
“participat[ing] in, or interven[ing] in (including the publishing or
distributing of statements), any political campaign on behalf of (or in
opposition to) any candidate for public office.”91
Revenue Ruling 2007-41 is an administrative interpretation of the
Johnson Amendment analogous to Minnesota’s Election Day Policy
statement,92 which construes the Minnesota political apparel law,
and has the same infirmities as does that statement. What the Court
said about the Minnesota statute and the policy statement
interpreting that statute also applies to the Johnson Amendment and
Revenue Ruling 2007-41. Just as the Minnesota political apparel
statute improperly bans as “political” clothing and buttons that
advance generalized themes and groups without endorsing or
opposing particular candidates, parties, and ballot questions,93
Revenue Ruling 2007-41 categorizes as proscribed campaign

Id. (quoting TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 61.010(a) (West 2019)).
Minn. Voters All., 138 S. Ct. at 1892.
87 Id. While Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Breyer, dissented in Minnesota Voters
Alliance, she did not address the substantive merits of the Minnesota statute under the First
Amendment. See generally id. at 1893–97 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). Rather, Justice
Sotomayor’s disagreement with the Court was procedural in nature. See id. at 1893. She would
have certified the case to the Minnesota Supreme Court, thereby affording that court the
opportunity to construe Minnesota’s political apparel statute. See id.
88 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969).
89 Minn. Voters All., 138 S. Ct. at 1890.
90 Id. at 1891 (quoting Bd. of Airport Comm’rs v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 576
(1987)).
91 Rev. Rul. 2007-41, 2007-1 C.B. 1421, 1424; see also I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012).
92 Compare Minn. Voters All., 138 S. Ct. at 1884 (describing the Election Day Policy), with
Rev. Rul. 2007-41, 2007-1 C.B. at 1424 (interpreting the Johnson Amendment).
93 See id. at 1882.
85
86
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intervention “issue advocacy” that does not mention any candidate,
political party, or ballot question.94
In particular, Revenue Ruling 2007-41 cautions that
section 501(c)(3) organizations must avoid any issue advocacy
that functions as political campaign intervention. Even if a
statement does not expressly tell an audience to vote for or
against a specific candidate, an organization delivering the
statement is at risk of violating the political campaign
intervention prohibition if there is any message favoring or
opposing a candidate. . . . All the facts and circumstances need
to be considered to determine if the advocacy is political
campaign intervention.95
According to Revenue Ruling 2007-41, among the “facts and
circumstances” indicating whether issue advocacy is forbidden
campaign activity “favoring or opposing a candidate” is “[w]hether
the issue addressed in the communication has been raised as an issue
distinguishing candidates for a given office.”96
Revenue Ruling 2007-41 identifies mitigating factors that tend to
save a particular instance of issue advocacy from being classified as
forbidden campaign intervention.97 For example, issue advocacy is
less likely to be deemed prohibited campaign intervention if “the
communication is part of an ongoing series of communications by the
organization on the same issue that are made independent of the
timing of any election.”98 However, at the end of the day, according
to Revenue Ruling 2007-41, it is a matter of “facts and
circumstances”99 whether issue advocacy is forbidden campaign
intervention that costs a 501(c)(3) organization its tax-exempt its
status100—with all of the uncertainties inherent in any “facts and
circumstances” test.
The vague rule of Revenue Ruling 2007-41 that issue advocacy may
constitute forbidden campaign intervention depending on the “facts
and circumstances” violates the First Amendment standard of
reasonability laid out in Minnesota Voters Alliance. Like Minnesota’s
Rev. Rul. 2007-41, 2007-1 C.B. at 1424.
Id.
96 Id.
97 See id.
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Id. at 1423.
94
95
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ban on political apparel at polling places, Revenue Ruling 2007-41’s
concept of “issue advocacy” is unmoored, proscribing in
indeterminate fashion statements about issues of public policy.101
Under Revenue Ruling 2007-41, a statement may be deemed to be
forbidden campaign intervention even when that statement does not
refer to any candidate, political party, or ballot question.102 Revenue
Ruling 2007-41 lacks objective, workable standards when it declares
that, depending on the “facts and circumstances,” a tax-exempt
organization’s pronouncement on a public policy issue may violate
the Johnson Amendment’s ban on political campaigning—even if
such pronouncement does not mention any candidate, political party,
or ballot question at issue in a pending election.103
Consider, for example, a minister who wants to deliver a sermon
for or against removing statues of Robert E. Lee. Could that sermon
be considered forbidden campaign intervention under the issue
advocacy standard of Revenue Ruling 2007-41? It depends. The
uncertainties of Revenue Ruling 2007-41’s “facts and circumstances”
test could have a chilling effect on this minister’s decision to speak.
Suppose that the minister guesses wrong and gives a sermon for or
against Lee statues while candidates for office in the community are
advancing similar arguments. In this case, the minister’s sermon
could retrospectively be deemed campaign intervention “favoring or
opposing a candidate” for purposes of the Johnson Amendment.104 If
so, her church would lose its tax-exempt status under section
501(c)(3) because the topic of her sermon is characterized “as an issue
distinguishing candidates for a given office.”105
Under Minnesota Voters Alliance, a voter has a First Amendment
right to wear to the polls a t-shirt supporting or opposing the removal
of Robert E. Lee statues so long as no candidate, party, or ballot
question is mentioned.106 It is, thus, troubling for Revenue Ruling
2007-41 to indicate that, depending upon particular “facts and
circumstances,” the minister’s sermon about Lee statues might cost
her church its tax-exempt status for political campaigning, even if the
minister’s sermon mentions no candidate, party or ballot question.
Cf. Minn. Voters All. v. Mansky, 138 S. Ct. 1876, 1888 (2018).
See Rev. Rul. 2007-41, 2007-1 C.B. at 1424.
103 See id.; cf. Minn. Voters All., 138 S. Ct. at 1891 (noting that election judges’ discretion
must be guided by “objective, workable standards” to prevent bias in determining what
constitutes forbidden political activity).
104 Rev. Rul. 2007-41, 2007-1 C.B. at 1424.
105 Id. at 1421, 1424.
106 See Minn. Voters All., 138 S. Ct. at 1891.
101
102
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Minnesota Voters Alliance holds that regulatory restrictions on
political expression must be “objective”
and “workable.”107
Prohibitions on polling place apparel meet this First Amendment test
if they prevent the display of the names of candidates, parties, and
ballot issues involved in the current election.108 More generalized
prohibitions on “political” clothing and buttons do not meet this test
of determinacy.109 By analogy, the Johnson Amendment can,
consistent with the norms of the First Amendment, prohibit 501(c)(3)
organizations from endorsing or opposing candidates, parties, and
ballot questions. But the Johnson Amendment cannot preclude
broader issue advocacy by tax-exempt organizations when such
advocacy leaves unmentioned candidates, parties, and ballot
issues.110 Insofar as Revenue Ruling 2007-41 understands the
Johnson Amendment as banning broader issue advocacy, that
revenue ruling fails to give adequate notice as to what speech is or is
not proscribed by section 501(c)(3). Revenue Ruling 2007-41 is, thus,
constitutionally infirm in light of Minnesota Voters Alliance.
Consider another example that highlights the unconstitutional
indeterminacy of Revenue Ruling 2007-41’s restrictions on issue
advocacy. Suppose that a 501(c)(3) organization is located in a major
metropolitan area in which multiple campaigns are occurring for
different seats in the Congress and in the state legislature. Different
candidates in different races will raise different issues to advance
their particular candidacies. Revenue Ruling 2007-41’s restriction on
issue advocacy implies that this tax-exempt institution and its
personnel must monitor all of these electoral contests and must
refrain from discussing any issue that distinguishes the candidates
in any one of these races.111 Confronted with this daunting task, this
501(c)(3) entity may prudently protect its tax-exempt status by
eschewing all issues of public concern to avoid political campaigning
for purposes of the Johnson Amendment. This blanket silencing of
general political speech is the outcome that the First Amendment test
of Minnesota Voters Alliance prevents.

Id.
See, e.g., id.
109 See id. at 1888 (citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788,
808–09 (1985)).
110 See Rev. Rul. 2007-41, 2007-1 C.B. 1421, 1424–25.
111 See id. at 1424.
107
108

0001 ZELINSKY, APPLYING THE FIRST AMENDMENT TO THE IRC

2019/2020]

1/17/2020 2:37 PM

Applying the First Amendment to the IRC

17

III. THE CAMPAIGN INTERVENTION OF OTHER TAX-EXEMPT ENTITIES
While the Johnson Amendment of section 501(c)(3) is the best
known of the Code’s restrictions on the political activities of taxexempt organizations, the federal tax law also governs the political
activities
of
other
tax-exempt
entities
including civic
organizations,112 labor unions,113 and business leagues.114 Section
527(f) of the Code subjects to corporate taxation the political
expenditures of these and similar entities, which are tax-exempt
under section 501.115 Specifically, section 527(f) taxes at the
corporate income tax rate the lesser of the “exempt function”
expenditures of such an entity or such an entity’s net investment
income.116
For purposes of this tax, section 527(e)(2) defines a taxable exempt
function as
the function of influencing or attempting to influence the
selection, nomination, election, or appointment of any
individual to any Federal, State, or local public office or office
in a political organization, or the election of Presidential or
Vice-Presidential electors, whether or not such individual or
electors are selected, nominated, elected, or appointed.117
Suppose, for example, that in 2018 a labor union tax-exempt under
section 501(c)(5) has net investment income from dividends of $1,000
and spends $500 “to influence” a state legislative election. In light of
the current federal corporate income tax of twenty-one percent,118
this union owes the section 527(f) tax in the amount of $105.119
Just as Minnesota Voters Alliance indicates that the Johnson
Amendment must be construed objectively and workably to comply
with the First Amendment, that decision also indicates that section
527 must also be understood to comport with the First Amendment
requirement of reasonable determinacy.

112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119

I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) (2012).
§ 501(c)(5).
§ 501(c)(6).
See I.R.C. § 527(f)(1) (2012).
See § 527(f)(1)
§ 527(e)(2).
I.R.C. § 11(b) (2012 & Supp. V 2018).
$500 × 21% = $105.
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However, like Revenue Ruling 2007-41, Revenue Ruling 2004-6120
unconstitutionally construes “influence” for section 527 purposes in
imprecise, overly broad terms. Revenue Ruling 2004-6 contends that,
depending upon the “facts and circumstances,” issue advocacy by a
business league, labor union or civic organization may constitute
taxable “exempt function” activity under section 527 even if no
candidate is explicitly supported or opposed.121 In three of the six
examples in Revenue Ruling 2004-6, the IRS concludes that issue
advocacy is a taxable expenditure under section 527(f) even though
in none of these examples is a candidate endorsed or rejected.122 Per
Minnesota Voters Alliance, such a vague “facts and circumstances”
restriction on the speech of nonprofit entities is unconstitutional.
Consider, for example, situation three of Revenue Ruling 2004-6.
In that example, an entity exempt from a tax under section 501(c)(4)
runs a full-page newspaper ad “shortly before an election.”123 The ad
supports a federal allocation to build a hospital and mentions that
the state’s U.S. senator twice voted for such funding.124 The senator
is running for re-election. The ad does not explicitly endorse the
senator or urge her re-election.125 Revenue Ruling 2004-6 concludes
that this advertisement is an “exempt function,” which triggers the
tax imposed by section 527(f) as an attempt to influence an
election.126
This conclusion contradicts the teaching of Minnesota Voters
Alliance. No statement in this newspaper ad urges voters to re-elect
(or vote against) the senator. The ruling apparently deems this ad to
be campaign intervention because it mentions the senator and occurs
too close to election time. But how close is too close? Six months?
Six weeks? Six days? If this 501(c)(4) organization guesses wrong
under the “facts and circumstances” test of Revenue Ruling 2004-6,
the organization owes the section 527(f) penalty tax for expressing its
views on a matter of public concern.127
While it may be plausible to view this ad as an attempt “to
influence” the election, that is not the only possible interpretation of
the ad. The thrust of the ad is that federal funding for hospitals is
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127

Rev. Rul. 2004-6, 2004-1 C.B. 328.
See id. at 330.
See id. at 331.
Id.
See id.
See id.
Id.
See id.
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desirable. That is a legitimate comment on public policy.
Situation four of Revenue Ruling 2004-6 is similar and is similarly
troublesome for First Amendment purposes in light of Minnesota
Voters Alliance. In that example, an organization tax exempt under
section 501(c)(4) runs radio ads favoring increased state funding for
public education.128 These ads run “shortly before an election” in
which an incumbent governor seeks to return to office.129 The
governor had earlier vetoed an income tax increase designed to
augment spending on public schools.130 The ad tells listeners to
contact the governor but neither endorses nor opposes the governor
or his opponent.131 The IRS concludes that these radio ads are
“exempt function” outlays triggering the tax imposed by section
527(f)—even though listeners are not asked to vote against (or for)
the governor.132
This example again implicates the uncertainty of timing under a
“facts and circumstances” test: How close to the election is too close?
Moreover, this pro-expenditure ad does not inform the listener of the
governor’s record or her current position on school funding.133 The
implicit premise of this example is that some listeners will know of
the governor’s veto and will understand the ad as urging a vote
against the governor.134 An equally plausible interpretation of the ad
is that it means what it says: please call the governor and tell her you
favor public school funding.
Finally, situation six of Revenue Ruling 2004-6 involves a 501(c)(4)
organization that opposes the death penalty.135 The governor of the
state is running for re-election and supports the death penalty.136
“[S]hortly before” the election, this organization runs a television
advertisement opposing the death penalty.137 The advertisement
does not mention the governor’s opponent and does not urge a vote
against the governor.138 The advertisement notes the governor’s
support for the death penalty and asks viewers to contact the

128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138

See id.
Id.
See id.
See id.
Id.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 332.
See id.
Id.
See id.
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governor to oppose the death penalty.139 The IRS again concludes
that this radio ad is an “exempt function” expenditure triggering
taxation under section 527(f).140
This situation is a stronger example for the IRS’s position than is
situation four since in this example the anti-death penalty ad tells
the viewer that the governor favors capital punishment.141 But,
again, on its face, the advertisement only asks the viewer to contact
the governor to oppose capital punishment.142 Is this ad too close to
the election or so explicit as to constitute campaign intervention
against the governor? Minnesota Voters Alliance requires a more
workable, more objective test under the First Amendment.143
In all three of these examples, according to the IRS, an
organization’s issue advocacy results in a taxable “exempt function”
expenditure under section 527(f) even though no candidate for office
is expressly endorsed or opposed.144 Minnesota Voters Alliance
stands in contrast to the IRS’s position in these examples under
section 527(f) of the Code.145 In all three of these situations, a taxexempt organization articulates neither explicit opposition to nor
express support for a political candidate.146 Everything the Court
found wrong with the Minnesota voting apparel statute is wrong with
these examples. The IRS’s understanding of an “exempt function”
expenditure that attempts to “influence” an election is indeterminate,
reaching beyond explicit endorsements of, or opposition to,
candidates to tax more generalized discussions of political issues.
Under Minnesota Voters Alliance, Revenue Ruling 2004-6’s “facts and
circumstances” understanding of what constitutes an attempt to
“influence” an election is insufficiently “objective” or “workable” for
First Amendment purposes.147
Consider another hypothetical under section 527(f) of the Code.
Suppose that a union prints and distributes a brochure denouncing

See id.
Id.
141 See id.
142 See id.
143 See Minn. Voters All. v. Mansky, 138 S. Ct. 1876, 1891 (2018).
144 See Rev. Rul. 2004-6, 2004-1 C.B. at 331–32.
145 Compare Minn. Voters All., 138 S. Ct. at 1888 (citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. &
Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 808–09 (1985)) (“[T]he State must be able to articulate some
sensible basis for distinguishing what may come in from what must stay out.”), with Rev. Rul.
2004-6, 2004-1 C.B. at 331–32 (demonstrating that the IRS sometimes will and sometimes will
not find an “exempt function” without express support or opposition).
146 See Rev. Rul. 2004-6, 2004-1 C.B. at 331.
147 See Minn. Voters All., 138 S. Ct. at 1891.
139
140
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the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decision in Janus v. American
Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees, Council 31.148
Has the union thereby engaged in a taxable exempt function for
purposes of the section 527 tax? It depends. If the union has no net
investment income, it will not, in practice, care since zero net
investment income produces no tax under section 527(f) of the
Code.149 But, as a constitutional matter, it is problematic after
Minnesota Voters Alliance to declare that discussion of issues of
public concern (like Janus) might trigger the “exempt function” tax
depending upon the factual circumstances in which the discussion
occurs.
Such generalized issue advocacy might also cost an organization its
tax-exempt status under section 501(c)(4). Treasury Regulation
section 1.501(c)(4)-1150 states that a civic league must promote “social
welfare.”151 The regulation further provides that “[t]he promotion of
social welfare does not include direct or indirect participation or
intervention in political campaigns on behalf of or in opposition to
any candidate for public office.”152
This regulatory standard is also unconstitutionally indeterminate
under Minnesota Voters Alliance. “[I]ndirect . . . intervention” in a
political race goes beyond support for, or opposition to, a candidate
and might, depending upon the facts and circumstances, encompass
general issue advocacy that “indirect[ly]” supports or opposes a
candidate.153
Minnesota Voters Alliance indicates that when political speech is
regulated, it must be regulated reasonably, in an objective, workable
fashion. In light of Minnesota Voters Alliance, Revenue Ruling
2004-6, interpreting section 527(f) of the Code, and Treasury
Regulation section 1.501(c)(4)-1, interpreting section 501(c)(4) of the
Code, are overly broad and indeterminate. These imprecise measures
accordingly must be reformed to give tax-exempt organizations better
notice of the political activity that can trigger taxation or loss of taxexempt status.

148
149
150
151
152
153

Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018).
See I.R.C. § 527(f)(1)(A) (2012).
See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1 (as amended in 1990).
Id. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(1)(ii).
Id. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(ii).
See id.
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IV. THE CODE’S BAN ON TAX-EXEMPT ENTITIES’ LOBBYING
A. The General Ban on 501(c)(3) Organizations’ Lobbying
Just as the bans on general issue advocacy established by Revenue
Rulings 2007-41 and 2004-6 unconstitutionally restrict political
speech under Minnesota Voters Alliance, the Treasury regulation
implementing section 501(c)(3)’s prohibition on lobbying is
“unmoored” and “indeterminate” for First Amendment purposes. As
a statutory matter, section 501(c)(3) of the Code provides that “no
substantial part of the activities” of an organization tax exempt
under section 501(c)(3) may consist of “carrying on propaganda, or
otherwise attempting, to influence legislation.”154 This statutory
prohibition on “influenc[ing] legislation” is often characterized as a
ban on “lobbying” by 501(c)(3) entities.155
The Treasury regulation interpreting section 501(c)(3)’s lobbying
ban states that a tax-exempt organization offends this ban if the
organization
(a) Contacts, or urges the public to contact, members of a
legislative body for the purpose of proposing, supporting, or
opposing legislation; or (b) Advocates the adoption or rejection
of legislation.156
This expansive regulation runs afoul of Minnesota Voters Alliance
and the First Amendment standard of reasonability that Minnesota
Voters Alliance promulgates for regulating political speech.157 Just
as the undefined term political is indeterminate in the context of the
Minnesota voter apparel statute, the undefined term legislation is
indeterminate in the context of section 501(c)(3).158 Every issue of
public policy can result in legislation. Hence, the unmoored term
legislation proscribes in this context most discussions of public
concerns since such concerns can be framed as legislation. Also
overbroad is the statutory term substantial, which provides no real
guidance as to the quantity of speech that causes the loss of an
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012).
See §§ 501(c)(3), 4911(a)(1); Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 543
(1983) (articulating § 501(c)(3)’s ban on using tax-deductible contributions toward activities
that influence legislation as a “prohibition against substantial lobbying”).
156 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3)(ii)(a)–(b) (as amended in 2017).
157 See Minn. Voters All. v. Mansky, 138 S. Ct. 1876, 1888 (2018) (citing Cornelius v. NAACP
Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 808–09 (1985)).
158 See id. at 1889.
154
155
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institution’s tax-exempt status under section 501(c)(3).
To see the unworkable nature of the undefined terms legislation
and substantial and their unreasonably broad impact on political
speech, consider again the minister who contemplates delivering a
sermon for or against the removal of statues of Robert E. Lee. This
sermon might be the minister’s only statement ever touching on a
matter of public controversy. If so, this sermon can plausibly be
considered an insubstantial part of the church’s activities.
But, suppose that the minister regularly discusses from the pulpit
issues of public interest such as abortion, same sex marriage, and
immigration. Consequently, section 501(c)(3) and the regulations
implementing that section’s ban on lobbying require two, fact-based
inquiries:159 First, is the minister’s proposed sermon about Lee
statues, along with her other public policy pronouncements, a
“substantial part” of the church’s activities? Second, if they are, do
the Lee homily and these other pronouncements “[a]dvocate[] the
adoption or rejection of legislation[?]”160
As I discuss in Section IV.B of this Article, Congress itself
acknowledged the indeterminacy of these tests when, under sections
501(h) and 4911,161 Congress gave many 501(c)(3) organizations the
option to elect an objective safe harbor for lobbying expenditures.162
However, important 501(c)(3) entities, including churches and their
auxiliaries, cannot elect this safe harbor.163
Thus, tax-exempt entities confront the question of what constitutes
advocacy for or against “legislation” for purposes of section 501(c)(3).
Since any issue of public policy can be framed as legislation, any
statement on a matter of public concern can be construed as a
comment for or against “legislation.”
Consider again a sermon supporting the retention or removal of

159 See Mysteryboy Inc. v. Comm’r, No. 21011-08X, 2010 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 14, at *42
(T.C. Jan. 26, 2010).
160 See § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3)(ii)(b); see also Mysteryboy, 2010 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 14, at *42
(“Under section 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3)(ii) . . . , an organization is an action organization if a
substantial part of its activities is attempting to influence legislation by propaganda or
otherwise. . . . [A]n organization is to be regarded as attempting to influence legislation if the
organization (1) contacts, or urges the public to contact, members of a legislative body for the
purpose of proposing, supporting, or opposing legislation or (2) advocates the adoption or
rejection of legislation.”).
161 See I.R.C. § 501(h) (2012 & Supp. V 2018); I.R.C. § 4911 (2012). For more background on
these provisions of the Code, see ZELINSKY, TAXING THE CHURCH, supra note, 12, at 191, and
Zelinsky, Safe Harbor, supra note 12 at 1532.
162 See §§ 501(h)(1)(A), 4911(c).
163 See § 501(h)(5)(A)–(B).
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Lee statues. City councils can by ordinance confirm their respective
communities’ Lee statue or can mandate the statue’s removal.164
Similarly, both state165 and federal166 legislation can address the
subject of Lee statues. Thus, this sermon is plausibly characterized
as advocating or opposing legislation—even if no particular
ordinance is mentioned in the sermon or is pending in the community
in which the church is located. To urge the removal or retention of a
Lee statue is to advocate “legislation,” unless that term is qualified
to make it more objective and workable.
Likewise, suppose that the president of a tax-exempt hospital
devotes considerable effort discussing the dangers of opioid abuse.
This, too, is a matter of public concern that can result in legislation.167
In short, for purposes of section 501(c)(3)’s general ban on taxexempt organizations’ lobbying, it is often unclear when an
organization’s comments constitute lobbying for legislation as most
topics of public concern can be addressed through legislation. It is,
moreover, ambiguous when lobbying is “substantial.”168 It is, thus,
uncertain when public comments by a 501(c)(3) entity and its
personnel will jeopardize that entity’s tax-exempt status due to
statutorily forbidden lobbying. That uncertainty runs afoul of the
First Amendment teaching of Minnesota Voters Alliance that, to be
reasonable, restrictions on political speech must be workable,
objective, and determinate.169
B. The Safe Harbor Lobbying Ban of Sections 501(h) and 4911
In recognition of the uncertainties surrounding the section
501(c)(3) ban on lobbying, Congress provided in sections 501(h) and
4911 a statutory safe harbor that many (but not all) 501(c)(3)
organizations may elect.170 Though this safe harbor was enacted as
part of the Tax Reform Act of 1976,171 this safe harbor addresses the

See NEW ORLEANS, LA. CODE OF ORDINANCES § 146-611(b) (2014).
See H.B. 1099, 2018 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2018); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1002.1 (2018) (“[A] monument, memorial, or work of art owned by the State may not be removed,
relocated, or altered in any way without the approval of the North Carolina Historical
Commission.”).
166 See Robert E. Lee Statue Removal Act, H.R. 3779, 115th Cong. § 2 (1st Sess. 2017).
167 See Combating Opioid Abuse for Care in Hospitals Act of 2018, H.R. 5774, 115th Cong.
(2d Sess. 2018).
168 See § 501(c)(3).
169 See Minn. Voters All. v. Mansky, 138 S. Ct. 1876, 1891 (2018).
170 See I.R.C. § 501(h)(1)–(5) (2012 & Supp. V 2018); I.R.C. § 4911(a) (2012).
171 See Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1307, 90 Stat. 825, 1720 (1976) (codified
164
165
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First Amendment concerns that Minnesota Voters Alliance
articulated four decades later. Central to this elective safe harbor
are the statutory terms legislation, action, and influencing
legislation.172 For these purposes, legislation is defined to include
“action with respect to Acts, bills, resolutions, or similar items by the
Congress, any State legislature, any local council, or similar
governing body, or by the public in a referendum, initiative,
constitutional amendment, or similar procedure.”173
For purposes of this safe harbor, the statutory term action is
“limited to the introduction, amendment, enactment, defeat, or
repeal of Acts, bills, resolution, or similar items.”174 Influencing
legislation, a/k/a lobbying, is then defined as “any attempt to
influence any legislation through [either] an attempt to affect the
opinions of the general public or any segment thereof . . . [or]
communication with any member or employee of a legislative body,
or with any government official or employee who may participate in
the formulation of the legislation.”175
For purposes of the lobbying safe harbor created by sections 501(h)
and 4911, the statutory term influencing legislation excludes, among
other activities, the internal communications of an organization with
“its bona fide members”176 unless such communication “directly
encourage[s]” such members either to themselves lobby any
legislator, legislative employee, government official or government
employee,177 or to “urge” nonmembers to engage in such lobbying.178
This detailed definition of legislation and forbidden (and
permitted) lobbying replaces for electing entities the unmoored,
expansive term legislation as used in section 501(c)(3). Consider
again the president of a tax-exempt hospital who speaks about the
dangers of opioid abuse. As long as she does not advocate a particular
bill pending before a legislative body or the electorate, these
comments are not efforts to “influence legislation”—if the hospital
has made the safe harbor lobbying election of section 501(h).179
Under that safe harbor, general discussion of public policy issues is

as amended at I.R.C. § 501(h)).
172 See § 4911(a)(1)–(2).
173 § 4911(e)(2).
174 § 4911(e)(3).
175 § 4911(d)(1)(A)–(B).
176 § 4911(d)(2)(D).
177 § 4911(d)(3)(A).
178 § 4911(d)(3)(B).
179 See I.R.C. § 501(h) (2012 & Supp. V 2018); § 4911(d)(1)(A)–(B).
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excluded from the definition of forbidden lobbying even if such issues
could (as most do) result in the adoption of legislation.180 Even if this
hospital president does advocate “action” with respect to particular
legislation, her comments will not jeopardize her institution’s taxexempt status under section 501(c)(3) unless the hospital’s overall
lobbying activities trigger the dollar levels established by sections
501(h) and 4911—but, again, only if the hospital has made the safe
harbor election for its lobbying activities.181 If not, these comments
by the hospital president potentially run afoul of the expansive and
unmoored lobbying ban of section 501(c)(3).
Contrast this with the minister’s discussion of Lee statues.
Because the church cannot elect the safe harbor of section 501(h),182
this minister cannot be sure whether or not her sermon is forbidden
lobbying or whether, combined with her other statements, her
sermon is “substantial.”183 Unlike section 4911, section 501(c)(3)
contains no protection for communications within the church.184 This
minister and her church, in contrast to the hospital that makes the
section 501(h) election, are subject to the indeterminacy which, per
Minnesota Voters Alliance, violates the First Amendment tests of
workability and objectivity.
V. IMPLEMENTING MINNESOTA VOTERS ALLIANCE: EXPRESS
ADVOCACY AND FUNCTIONAL EQUIVALENCE
Per Minnesota Voters Alliance, the First Amendment test of
reasonability requires that restrictions on political expression be
objective, workable, and determinant.185 However, the particular
rule used to implement that test in Minnesota Voters Alliance does
not work well in other settings, namely, the Johnson Amendment,
the section 527(f) tax on political campaign intervention, and the
regulatory prohibition on campaigning by civic leagues. Rather than
the “no mention” rule Minnesota Voters Alliance approves for voting
place apparel prohibitions, I argue in this Part that, in the context of
the Code’s bans on campaigning by tax-exempt entities, the First
Amendment requirement of reasonability is best implemented
through Chief Justice Roberts’ test articulated in FEC v. Wisconsin
180
181
182
183
184
185

See § 4911(d)(1)(A)–(B).
See § 501(h); 4911(c)(2).
See § 501(h)(5).
See § 501(c)(3).
See § 501(h)(5).
See Minn. Voters All. v. Mansky, 138 S. Ct. 1876, 1891 (2018).
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Right to Life, Inc.: Only express advocacy of candidates, parties, or
ballot questions, or the “functional equivalent” of such express
advocacy should run afoul of the tax law.186 Functional equivalence
should be construed narrowly,187 as the Chief Justice indicated, to
include only speech “susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other
than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate[,]” party
or ballot question.188
In the context of section 501(c)(3)’s lobbying ban, I suggest that the
statutory standards of section 4911 be applied to all tax-exempt
entities, not just to those that make the safe harbor election under
section 501(h).
These changes could be implemented
administratively or by congressional modification of the Code.189
Under Minnesota Voters Alliance, a state may maintain polling
place decorum by forbidding at the polls clothing or buttons that
mention candidates, parties, or ballot questions involved in the
current election.190 This “no mention” test works well for voting place
apparel because voting is a discrete activity that occurs briefly at a
particular point in time.191 It is easy to ascertain who is a candidate
in the current election, the parties that have fielded candidates, and
any ballot issues being decided. Consequently, at the polls,
forbidding the names of candidates, parties, or ballot questions is a
workable and objective rule, easily administrable at the specific point
in time of a particular election.
However, this “no mention” test does not transfer well to other
settings that occur over extended periods. A rule against naming
candidates, parties, and ballot questions is overly broad in these
other contexts and can interfere with much generalized political
discussion.
Our political culture today is a “permanent campaign.”192 Except
for public officials who are term-limited or who have formally
renounced re-election, all public officials are continually running for
re-election around the calendar.193 If the no-mention-of-a-candidate
rule applied under the Johnson Amendment, 501(c)(3) organizations
could never articulate the name of any elected officials since today all
FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 469–70 (2007).
See id.
188 Id. at 470.
189 See Benjamin J. Cohen & Catherine A. Harrington, Is the Internal Revenue Service
Bound by Its Own Regulations and Rulings?, 51 TAX LAWYER 675, 675 (1998).
190 See Minn. Voters All., 138 S. Ct. at 1891.
191 See Stewart, supra note 33, at 450.
192 See, e.g., Heclo, supra note 34, at 1.
193 See, e.g., id. at 17.
186
187
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officials are continuously candidates.
Such an overly broad
restriction would forbid much speech that is not campaign
intervention.
Suppose, for example, that a church informs its parishioners that
the local congresswoman will be holding an informational session for
current and prospective social security recipients. Under a rule
forbidding a 501(c)(3) entity from mentioning the name of a
candidate, the Johnson Amendment would forbid this statement
unless the congresswoman had announced that this is her last term
in office.194 If the congresswoman is running for re-election (as most
representatives interminably are), this church would violate the
Johnson Amendment under a test forbidding a church or other taxexempt institution from uttering the name of a candidate.195
Members of Congress are today continuously candidates.
Consider again the minister who wants to deliver a sermon for or
against retaining statues of Robert E. Lee. If a community is voting
on an ordinance on this subject, it is workable to declare that no
buttons or clothing may be worn at the polls mentioning this topic.196
But, per Minnesota Voters Alliance, it violates the First Amendment
to leave the minister in a legal limbo, not knowing whether or not,
under a facts-and-circumstances test, her sermon could retroactively
be deemed campaign intervention or lobbying, which would cost her
church its tax-exempt status because candidates for office had
discussed this issue.197
The best way to implement Minnesota Voters Alliance in the
contexts of the Johnson Amendment and of sections 527(f) and
501(c)(4) is the test articulated by Chief Justice Roberts in FEC v.
Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc.198 Under that test, tax-exempt
organizations’ political speech would be prohibited or taxed as
forbidden campaigning only if such speech were express advocacy of
a candidate, political party or ballot question or were the “functional
equivalent” of such express advocacy.199
The Chief Justice formulated this test against the background of
Buckley v. Valeo200 and McConnell v. FEC.201 In its review of section
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201

See ZELINSKY, TAXING THE CHURCH, supra note 12, at 188–89.
See id.
See Minn. Voters All. v. Mansky, 138 S. Ct. 1876, 1888, 1891 (2018).
See id. at 1888–89.
See FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 469–70 (2007).
Id.
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 90 (2003); see Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. at 456–57
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608(e)(1)202 of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, the
Buckley Court subjected to First Amendment scrutiny that section’s
limits on “any expenditure . . . relative to a clearly identified
candidate.”203 The statutory phrase relative to, the Buckley Court
observed, “fails to clearly mark the boundary between permissible
and impermissible speech.”204 To avoid unconstitutional vagueness,
that phrase must “be read to mean ‘advocating the election or defeat
of’ a candidate.”205 But, the Court continued, even “this construction”
of the phrase relative to does not “eliminate[] the problem of
unconstitutional vagueness altogether.”206 “For the distinction
between discussion of issues and candidates and advocacy of election
or defeat of candidates may often dissolve in practical application.”207
Thus, “in order to preserve the provision against invalidation on
vagueness grounds, § 608(e)(1) must be construed to apply only to
expenditures for communications that in express terms advocate the
election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate for federal office.”208
Even as so “narrowly and explicitly” construed to avoid
unconstitutional vagueness,209 the Court held that the expenditure
limits established by § 608(e)(1) fail First Amendment muster
because such limits burden an individual’s ability to communicate
her views.210 For our purposes, Buckley implemented the distinction
between “express” support for candidates and other political speech
in an important footnote that gave rise to what derisively became
known as the “magic words”211 of that opinion: “This construction
would restrict the application of § 608(e)(1) to communications
containing express words of advocacy of election or defeat, such as
‘vote for,’ ‘elect,’ ‘support,’ ‘cast your ballot for,’ ‘Smith for Congress,’
‘vote against,’ ‘defeat,’ ‘reject.’”212
The Buckley Court also subjected to First Amendment vagueness
analysis the Act’s requirement that individuals disclose their
expenditures “for the purpose of . . . influencing” the process of
(first quoting McConnell, 540 U.S. at 206; and then quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 42).
202 18 U.S.C. § 608 (Supp. V 1975) (repealed 1976).
203 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 39.
204 Id. at 41.
205 Id. at 42.
206 Id.
207 Id.
208 Id. at 44.
209 Id.
210 See id. at 52.
211 See, e.g., McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 90, 127 (2003).
212 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44 n.52.
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electing federal officers.213 In this setting, the Court “encounter[ed]
line-drawing problems of the sort”214 arising in the context of
§ 608(e)(1) and that section’s prohibition of expenditures “relative to”
federal candidacies.215 Like the phrase relative to, the term for the
purpose of influencing “shares the same potential for encompassing
both issue discussion and advocacy of a political result.”216 To insure
that the definition of “expenditure” (and its attendant disclosure
requirement) “is not impermissibly broad,”217 the Buckley Court
opined, “[W]e construe ‘expenditure’ . . . in the same way we
construed the terms of § 608(e)—to reach only funds used for
communications that expressly advocate the election or defeat of a
clearly identified candidate.”218
“As [so] narrowed,”219 the
expenditure disclosure requirement was held constitutional.220
Twenty-seven years after Buckley, the Court revisited and found
wanting that opinion’s distinction between express advocacy and
more generalized issue advocacy.221 In McConnell v. FEC, a fiveJustice majority declared that “[w]hile the distinction between ‘issue’
and express advocacy seemed neat in theory, the two categories of
advertisements proved functionally identical in important
respects.”222
Advertisements could “avoid the use of [Buckley’s] magic words”223
but still effectively “advocate the election or defeat of clearly
identified federal candidates.”224 This observation led the McConnell
Court to uphold expenditure restrictions imposed by the Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act of 2002:
Nor are we persuaded, independent of our precedents, that
the First Amendment erects a rigid barrier between express
advocacy and so-called issue advocacy. That notion cannot be
squared with our longstanding recognition that the presence

213 2 U.S.C. § 431(e) (1976) (current version at 52 U.S.C. § 30101(8) (2012)); Buckley, 424
U.S. at 63.
214 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 78–79.
215 Id.
216 Id. at 79.
217 Id. at 80.
218 Id.
219 Id.
220 See id. at 80–81, 84.
221 See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 126 (2003).
222 Id. at 114, 196.
223 Id. at 127.
224 Id. at 126.
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or absence of magic words cannot meaningfully distinguish
electioneering speech from a true issue ad. . . . Indeed, the
unmistakable lesson from the record in this litigation, as all
three judges on the District Court agreed, is that Buckley’s
magic-words requirement is functionally meaningless.225
Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion in FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life,
Inc.226 subsequently breathed new life into Buckley’s distinction
between express advocacy and more general issue advertising.227
Wisconsin Right to Life upheld as-applied restrictions on corporate
political expenditures only if such restrictions are limited to express
advocacy of specific candidates or parties, and to “the functional
equivalent of express advocacy.”228 The First Amendment requires
that such equivalence be construed narrowly: “[A]n ad is the
functional equivalent of express advocacy only if the ad is susceptible
of no reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or
against a specific candidate.”229
Minnesota Voters Alliance reinforces the distinction (asserted in
Buckley, discounted in McConnell, revived in Wisconsin Right to Life)
between express advocacy and more generalized issue advocacy.230
McConnell’s dismissal of “magic words” ignores the First Amendment
values of Minnesota Voters Alliance:231 “magic words” of express
advocacy are objective, workable, and determinate. “Magic words”
notify the speaker what he may and may not say. “Magic words” of
express advocacy cabin the discretion of those enforcing restrictions
on political speech.
Of course, skilled rhetoricians will try to skirt the limits of the
magic words of express advocacy. For example, to avoid a nomention-of-a-candidate rule, a voter in 2016 might have worn to the
225 Id. at 193 (first citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 45 (1976); then citing McConnell v.
FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 303–04 (D.C. Dist. 2003) (opinion of Henderson, J.); id. at 534
(opinion of Kollar-Kotelly, J.); id. at 875–79 (opinion of Leon, J.)).
226 See Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 455 (2007).
227 See id. at 478–79.
228 Id.
229 Id. at 469–470. Ultimately, Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010), held that
expenditure restrictions cannot apply to corporations and labor unions as such. See id. at 372
(citing McConnell, 540 U.S. at 341).
230 See Minn. Voters All. v. Mansky, 138 S. Ct. 1876, 1888, 1891 (2018).
231 Compare McConnell, 540 U.S. at 217 (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 45, 46, 48) (holding that
the clear and objective “magic words” described in Buckley were unconstitutional and violated
the First Amendment), with Minn. Voters All., 138 S. Ct. at 1891 (finding that when regulating
speech at polling places, a state must “employ a more discernible approach” than the openended regulations promulgated by Minnesota).
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polls a T-shirt that read, “It takes a village,” or, “You’re fired.” Or a
minister may have used either of these phrases from the pulpit.
Chief Justice Roberts addressed this problem by defining “the
functional equivalent of express advocacy” narrowly, as speech
“susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal
to vote for or against a specific candidate.”232 This circumscribed rule
does not eliminate all potential borderline problems, determining
what phrases are functionally equivalent to express advocacy.
However, applied to tax-exempt entities, the Chief Justice’s narrow
formulation of functional equivalence protects the exercise of First
Amendment rights as Minnesota Voters Alliance mandates.
No legislation is required to incorporate into the tax law the
standards of Wisconsin Right to Life.233
As to the Johnson
Amendment, the IRS can revise Revenue Ruling 2007-41 to replace
that ruling’s current discussion of issue advocacy with a more
determinate standard.234 Section 501(c)(3) status should be lost
under the Johnson Amendment only by explicit support of, or
opposition to, particular candidates, parties, or ballot questions or by
expression that can only be reasonably understood as the functional
equivalent of such overt advocacy.
Likewise, the IRS should delete from Revenue Ruling 2004-6 the
three examples, discussed above,235 under which the section 527(f)
tax is triggered by the mere mention of an elected official near
election time. Instead, the tax should be levied only if a tax-exempt
organization explicitly endorses or opposes a candidate for public
office, a political party, or a ballot question or if such an organization
engages in speech that can only be understood as the functional
equivalent of such express support or opposition. Finally, the
Treasury regulation under section 501(c)(4) should be revised to
indicate that tax-exempt status as a civic league is only forfeited for
political campaigning if such campaigning takes the form of express
advocacy or its functional equivalent.236
Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. at 469–70.
See generally id. (demonstrating that the Court can apply this standard on their own
instead of waiting for a new standard to be legislated).
234 See Cohen & Harrington, supra note 189, at 675.
235 See supra text accompanying notes 72–80.
236 On November 29, 2013, the Treasury proposed regulations under § 501(c)(4).
See
Guidance for Tax-Exempt Social Welfare Organizations on Candidate-Related Policy Activities,
78 Fed. Reg. 71,535 (Nov. 19, 2013). Congress subsequently blocked the promulgation of these
regulations. See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-113, § 127, 129 Stat.
2242 (2015). Whether the 116th Congress will permit the Treasury to proceed with these or
other regulations remains to be seen.
232
233
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In the absence of (or in lieu of) such administrative implementation
of the First Amendment standards of Minnesota Voters Alliance,
Congress could amend the relevant Code provisions—sections
501(c)(3), 501(c)(4), 527(f)—to incorporate the Chief Justice’s test
from Wisconsin Right to Life.237
For those who would deride this approach as revivifying the “magic
words” of express advocacy, I would agree with the premise but not
the conclusion: Minnesota Voters Alliance and its First Amendment
test of reasonability highlight the benefits of magic words. Magic
words are determinate, objective, and workable.
To bring the lobbying ban of section 501(c)(3) into congruence with
the First Amendment standards of Minnesota Voters Alliance, the
IRS or the Treasury could, by revenue ruling or regulation,
incorporate into section 501(c)(3) the First Amendment-compliant
definitions of section 4911.238
As an alternative to such
administrative action, Congress could amend the Code to apply to
section 501(c)(3) the definitions (“legislation,” “action,” “influencing
legislation”) of section 4911.239 Either way, those more determinate
definitions would apply to all 501(c)(3) organizations, not just to those
organizations that can and do make the safe harbor lobbying election
under section 501(h). Thus, for example, as long as specific
legislation is not endorsed, a sermon about Lee statues (or any other
similarly controversial issue of public concern) would be protected as
either internal communications among the church’s members or as
commentary, which does not constitute forbidden lobbying with
respect to particular pending legislation.
VI. REGAN V. TAXATION WITH REPRESENTATION
Defenders of Revenue Rulings 2004-6 and 2007-41 and the current
regulations under sections 501(c)(3) and 501(c)(4) might invoke
Regan v. Taxation with Representation. The nonprofit corporation
Taxation
with
Representation
(TWR)
challenged
the
constitutionality of the section 501(c)(3) lobbying ban.240 The U.S.
Supreme Court unanimously upheld it.241
In contesting the 501(c)(3) lobbying ban, TWR argued that the ban
237 See Minn. Voters All. v. Mansky, 138 S. Ct. 1876, 1891 (2018); Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S.
at 469–70.
238 See I.R.C. §§ 501(c)(3), 4911(d)(1), (e)(2)–(3) (2012); Minn. Voters All., 138 S. Ct. at 1891.
239 See §§ 501(c)(3), § 4911(d)(1), (e)(2)–(3).
240 Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 542 (1983).
241 See id. at 540, 550.
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was an “unconstitutional condition.”242 The Court agreed with TWR
“that the government may not deny a benefit to a person because he
exercises a constitutional right.”243 However, withholding taxexempt status from TWR under section 501(c)(3) because of forbidden
lobbying, the Court held, does not deny a government-bestowed
benefit.244 Rather, section 501(c)(3)’s prohibition of lobbying is
“merely” the “refus[al] to pay for the lobbying out of public moneys”245
in the form of tax-deductible contributions to tax-exempt entities:
“Congress has simply chosen not to pay for TWR’s lobbying.”246
Taxation with Representation, thus, upheld against First
Amendment challenge the section 501(c)(3) ban on lobbying.247 A
plausible reading of that decision is that it also sustains, under the
First Amendment, the Code’s other provisions relative to tax-exempt
organizations’ political speech, namely, the Johnson Amendment’s
ban on campaigning,248 the section 527(f) tax on political activity,249
and the regulatory prohibition on campaigning by 501(c)(4) civic
leagues.250 These provisions also reflect a congressional choice not to
pay for campaigning through tax-exemption or through the
charitable contribution deduction.
However, this reading of Taxation with Representation does not
challenge my argument. I do not contend that Minnesota Voters
Alliance invalidates the provisions of the tax law regulating and
taxing the political speech of tax-exempt entities. Minnesota Voters
Alliance does indicate that, under the First Amendment, these
provisions must be construed reasonably to provide “objective”251 and
“workable”252 standards to identify in determinate fashion forbidden
lobbying and campaign intervention.

Id. at 545 (citing Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 518 (1958)).
Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. at 545 (citing Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593,
597 (1972)).
244 See Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. at 545.
245 Id.
246 Id. at 546.
247 See id. at 550, 551.
248 See generally id. (“Congress has simply chosen not to pay for TWR’s lobbying.”); Laura
Brown Chisolm, Politics and Charity: A Proposal for Peaceful Coexistence., 58 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 308, 346–47 (1990) (discussing the Johnson Amendment).
249 See Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. at 546; Chisolm, supra note 248, at 330 n.105.
250 See Taxation with Representation, 361 U.S. at 546; Chisolm, supra note 248, at 328–29.
Professor Chisholm disagreed with this reading of Taxation with Representation. Id. at 322
(“Taxation with Representation does not settle the question of whether the section 501(c)(3)
prohibition on campaign participation is an unconstitutional condition.”).
251 Minn. Voters All. v. Mansky, 138 S. Ct. 1876, 1891 (2018).
252 Id.
242
243
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The content of the 501(c)(3) ban on lobbying was not at issue in
Taxation with Representation.253 TWR did not claim that the section
501(c)(3) concepts of substantiality and legislation had to be
construed narrowly to pass First Amendment scrutiny.254 Rather,
TWR argued that section 501(c)(3)’s lobbying ban should be struck
altogether.255 The Supreme Court rejected this claim.256 The Court
did not rule on the First Amendment need to construe the
“expansive”257 statutory concept of “legislation” since TWR did not
assert the need for determinacy.258 TWR wanted the lobbying ban
invalidated altogether.259
Taxation with Representation can, thus, be reconciled with
Minnesota Voters Alliance. Minnesota Voters Alliance approved
“objective” and “workable” restrictions on political expression at the
polls while striking as unconstitutionally unreasonable “unmoored,”
“indeterminate” prohibitions on such expression.260 Under this
approach to the First Amendment, the Johnson Amendment, the
section 501(c)(3) ban on lobbying, the section 527(f) tax, and the
regulatory ban on section 501(c)(4) campaigning must be construed
to provide fair notice of what behavior is (and is not) permitted under
those provisions. Consistent with the First Amendment, the Johnson
Amendment can prevent 501(c)(3) entities from endorsing or
opposing specific candidates, parties, and ballot questions.261 But the
Johnson Amendment can do no more than this. In particular, the
Johnson Amendment cannot proscribe a tax-exempt entity’s “issue
advocacy” if the entity does not expressly support or reject particular
candidates, parties, or ballot issues, or does not engage in expression,
which is the functional equivalent of such explicit advocacy.
Likewise, section 501(c)(3)’s ban on lobbying can, per Taxation with
Representation, prevent a tax-exempt entity from endorsing specific
legislation pending before a legislative body or slated for a popular
vote.262 However, under Minnesota Voters Alliance, the section
See Taxation with Representation, 361 U.S. at 551.
See id. at 543–44.
255 See id. at 543–44, 47 (citing Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 322 (1980)).
256 See Taxation with Representation, 361 U.S. at 551.
257 Minn. Voters All., 138 S. Ct. at 1888.
258 See Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. at 542.
259 See id. at 543–44.
260 See Minn. Voters All., 138 S. Ct. at 1888–89, 1891.
261 ZELINSKY, TAXING THE CHURCH, supra note 12, at 188.
262 Cf. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. at 548 (“Congress could, for example, grant
funds to an organization dedicated to combating teenage drug abuse, but condition the grant
by providing that none of the money received from Congress should be used to lobby state
253
254
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501(c)(3) lobbying ban cannot go beyond this to preclude all
pronouncements on public policy because public policy can always be
framed as proposed legislation.
Professor Steven Heyman supports the Court’s decision in
Taxation With Representation upholding the section 501(c)(3)
lobbying ban.263 However, he argues that the Court was wrong in
that case to approve the statutory ability of veterans’ groups to lobby
while retaining their tax-exemptions under section 501(c)(19).264
Granting tax-exempt veterans’ organizations permission to lobby
while denying such permission to section 501(c)(3) entities, he
contends, “unjustifiably discriminat[es] between citizens in the
political realm” in a manner that “clearly violate[s] equal
protection.”265
If Congress were to agree with Professor Heyman and deny taxexempt veterans’ groups the license to lobby, the holding of
Minnesota Voters Alliance would apply to any such denial.266 Hence,
a statutory lobbying ban could not preclude tax-exempt veterans’
groups from engaging in general discussion of public concerns. Under
the First Amendment, such a ban could prohibit explicit support for,
or opposition to, proposals pending before a legislative body or
scheduled for popular vote. Such a ban under section 501(c)(19) could
also preclude tax-exempt veterans’ organizations from engaging in
the “functional equivalent” of such express advocacy, as Chief Justice
Roberts narrowly defined such equivalence in Wisconsin Right to
Life.267 However, a statutory ban on lobbying by tax-exempt
veterans’ groups, like the prohibition on lobbying by section 501(c)(3)
organizations, could not preclude more generalized discussion of
political issues.
VII. THREE REJOINDERS
A. It’s Just About Clothing
A potential rejoinder to my analysis is that Minnesota Voters
Alliance is just about clothing at the polls. Polling place apparel was
the particular factual context in which Minnesota Voters Alliance was
legislatures.”).
263 See Steven J. Heyman, State-Supported Speech, 1999 WIS. L REV. 1119, 1158, 1159.
264 See id. at 1159.
265 Id. at 1160.
266 See Minn. Voters All., 138 S. Ct. at 1891.
267 See FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 469–70 (2007).
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decided.268 While there is much dicta in that decision,269 the
argument runs, the actual holding of Minnesota Voters Alliance is
limited to clothing at voting places.270
This rejoinder seeks to dismiss as dicta the broad articulation of
First Amendment principles endorsed by seven Justices in Minnesota
Voters Alliance. However, Minnesota Voters Alliance did not restrict
these principles to the subject of clothing. Rather, that decision
states First Amendment themes of general applicability, to wit, the
First Amendment requires that governmentally-imposed restrictions
on political speech be objective, workable, and determinate.271
The best reading of Minnesota Voters Alliance is that it is not just
a clothing case; the Court spoke in broader terms.272 Much of the
Court’s observations are technically dicta, but there is a reason
courts pronounce dicta.
B. The Court’s Limited Endorsement of the Chief Justice’s
Wisconsin Right to Life Test
Another potential rejoinder would note that Chief Justice Roberts’s
test in Wisconsin Right to Life, which I would incorporate into the tax
law to comply with Minnesota Voters Alliance, was only endorsed by
the Chief Justice and Justice Alito.273 The other three justices who
voted for the outcome sought by the Chief Justice in Wisconsin Right
to Life did so on different grounds.274
This criticism highlights the heavily normative nature of my
argument. I urge that the test endorsed by the Chief Justice—
explicit advocacy or the functional equivalent of explicit advocacy—
is the best way to make the tax law consistent with the First
Amendment standards of Minnesota Voters Alliance. Even the four
Justices who dissented in Wisconsin Right to Life should, after
Minnesota Voters Alliance, find persuasive in the tax context the test
fashioned by the Chief Justice. That test assures that the tax law
restrictions imposed on the political speech of tax-exempt institutions
will be workable, objective, and determinate.
Thus, to comply with the First Amendment standards of Minnesota
See Minn. Voters All., 138 S. Ct. at 1882.
See id. at 1890–91.
270 Id.
271 See id. at 1891.
272 See id. at 1891 (quoting Bd. of Airport Comm’rs v. Jews for Jesus, 482 U.S. 569, 576
(1987)) (citing Heffron v. Int’l Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 649 (1981)).
273 See FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 455 (2007).
274 See id. at 483, 504 (Scalia, J., concurring).
268
269
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Voters Alliance, the Johnson Amendment and the anti-campaigning
regulation under section 501(c)(4) should just bar explicit advocacy
and expression that can only be understood as the functional
equivalent of such express advocacy. Similarly, the section 527(f) tax
should just be triggered under these circumstances, namely, when a
tax-exempt entity explicitly speaks for or against a candidate, party,
or ballot issue or engages in speech that can only be reasonably
understood as the equivalent of such explicit advocacy. Under this
tightened standard, a tax-exempt institution could engage in more
general issue advocacy without fear of losing its exempt status or
being subject to taxation.
In contrast to my call to incorporate into the tax law Chief Justice
Roberts’s test from Wisconsin Right to Life, Professor Miriam Galston
“conclude[s] that it would be inappropriate to import the campaign
finance First Amendment standards developed by Citizens United
and Wisconsin Right to Life into tax law First Amendment
jurisprudence.”275 Professor Galston wrote in 2011, before the Court
decided Minnesota Voters Alliance. However, her argument could be
updated to suggest that the standards of Minnesota Voters Alliance
extend more broadly than clothing but still do not apply to the Code.
However, nothing in Minnesota Voters Alliance suggests that
restrictions on political speech must be workable, objective, and
determinate everywhere but the Code.276 There is today much
interesting debate, both in the academy277 and in the judiciary,278
about whether or not tax law is fundamentally different from other
areas of the law. For now, my claim is straightforward: nothing in
Minnesota Voters Alliance indicates that the tax law should be
exempted from that decision’s First Amendment standard that
restrictions on political speech must be workable, objective, and
determinate.
Moreover, as a normative matter, there is no compelling reason
why those First Amendment standards should not cover the tax law.
The strongest indication that the tax law can restrict taxpayer’s

275 Miriam Galston, When Statutory Regimes Collide: Will Citizens United and Wisconsin
Right to Life Make Federal Tax Regulation of Campaign Activity Unconstitutional?, 13 U. PA.
J. CONST. L. 867, 873–74 (2011).
276 See Minn. Voters All., 138 S. Ct. at 1891.
277 See, e.g., Daniel J. Hemel, The President’s Power to Tax, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 633, 654–
55 (2017) (“[A]nother example of tax exceptionalism.”) (emphasis removed).
278 See, e.g., Summa Holdings, Inc. v. Comm’r, 848 F.3d 779, 784 (6th Cir. 2017) (“If this case
dealt with any other title of the United States Code, we would stop there, end the suspense,
and rule for [the taxpayers].”).
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political expression is Taxation with Representation, which upheld
against constitutional challenge the 501(c)(3) lobbying ban.279 But
Minnesota Voters Alliance leaves that ban and Taxation with
Representation intact: Congress can forbid 501(c)(3) entities from
lobbying, but such forbidden lobbying must be defined in a workable
and determinate manner along the lines of section 4911. More
general discussion of public policy should not be classified as
prohibited lobbying because the policy discussed could lead to
legislation.
C. The IRS Does Not in Practice Enforce These Prohibitions
Yet, another rejoinder would characterize as remote the practical
threat to tax-exempt organizations from the restrictions of sections
501(c)(3), 501(c)(4), and 527(f). There is in practice, the rejoinder
would go, little IRS enforcement effort aimed at the campaigning and
lobbying of tax-exempt entities.
To the extent that reported case law indicates the level of IRS
enforcement activity, it is plausible to characterize the IRS’s efforts
in this area as minimal, despite all of the controversy about these
provisions. There is little case law in which the IRS pursues taxexempt entities for forbidden lobbying or campaigning.280
However, Minnesota Voters Alliance indicates that the relevant
concern is not the IRS’s practical enforcement policies, but “the
potential for erratic application”281 of an indeterminate law.
Minnesota’s ban on political apparel is unconstitutional because it is
not “capable of reasoned application.”282 Such “an indeterminate
prohibition carries with it ‘[t]he opportunity for abuse.’”283
This is equally true of the Code’s prohibitions on tax-exempt
entities’ lobbying and campaigning. Like the Minnesota apparel law,
these equally indeterminate features of the tax statute create “the
potential for erratic application.”284
From this vantage, the
reasonability requirement of the First Amendment is violated when
statutory vagueness creates “[t]he opportunity for abuse.”285 Even if
See Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 550, 551 (1983).
The leading cases in this area still remain Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137
(D.C. Cir. 2000), and Christian Echoes National Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849
(10th Cir. 1972). These are discussed in ZELINSKY, TAXING THE CHURCH, supra note 12, at 190–
91.
281 Minn. Voters All., 138 S. Ct. at 1890.
282 Id. at 1892.
283 Id. at 1891 (quoting Jews for Jesus, 482 U.S. at 576).
284 Minn. Voters All., 138 S. Ct. at 1890.
285 Id. at 1891 (quoting Jews for Jesus, 482 U.S. at 576).
279
280
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the IRS (or Minnesota’s election judges) in practice forbear from such
abuse, the law that gives them such “opportunity” is unreasonable
for First Amendment purposes.
CONCLUSION
The church-state entanglement issues raised by the Johnson
Amendment and by the 501(c)(3) lobbying ban are best addressed by
amending the Code to protect from all scrutiny the internal
communications of churches, synagogues, temples, mosques, and all
other religious congregations.286 In contrast, the First Amendment
problems discussed in this Article do not require legislation, though
they could be addressed that way.
Minnesota Voters Alliance highlighted the First Amendment
imperative that governmental regulation of political speech be
objective, and workable, unlike current law, which regulates a
nonprofit organization’s political expression in an overly broad and
impermissibly vague manner. After Minnesota Voters Alliance, the
Johnson Amendment should be interpreted as only proscribing
501(c)(3) entities from expressly endorsing or opposing particular
candidates, political parties, or ballot questions or from engaging in
the “functional equivalent” of such express advocacy. Under this test,
tax-exempt entities would not be precluded from engaging in more
general issue advocacy. Likewise, in light of Minnesota Voters
Alliance, sections 501(c)(4) and 527(e) of the Code should be
construed as precluding and taxing only express advocacy of, or
opposition to, particular candidates, parties, or ballot questions or as
prohibiting and taxing only the “functional equivalent” of such
explicit expression.
Such functional equivalence should be
understood narrowly as Chief Justice Roberts defined it in Wisconsin
Right to Life, namely, a statement “susceptible of no reasonable
interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific
candidate,” party, or ballot question.287
In light of Minnesota Voters Alliance, the 501(c)(3) lobbying ban
should be understood similarly, as only prohibiting tax-exempt
entities from explicitly supporting or opposing pending legislative
proposals or from undertaking the functional equivalent of such
explicit advocacy about pending legislation. The 501(c)(3) lobbying
286 See ZELINSKY, TAXING THE CHURCH, supra note 12, at 202; Zelinsky, Safe Harbor, supra
note 12, at 1545; Edward A. Zelinsky, Continuing the Debate on the Johnson Amendment,
EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV., Mar. 4, 2019, at 289, 293.
287 FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 470 (2007).
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ban should not prevent tax-exempt entities from discussing public
policy questions more generally, even though such questions can be
formulated as legislation.
The Code would thereby continue to regulate the political
expression of tax-exempt institutions but in ways which, unlike
current law, are consistent with the First Amendment norms of
reasonability, workability, objectivity, and determinacy articulated
in Minnesota Voters Alliance.

